Abstract-Number theoretic public key solutions are subject to various quantum attacks making them less attractive for longer term use. Certain group theoretic constructs show promise in providing quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives. We introduce a new protocol called a Meta Key Agreement and Authentication Protocol (MKAAP) that has some characteristics of a public key solution and some of a shared-key solution. Then we describe the Ironwood MKAAP, analyze its security, and show how it resists quantum attacks. We also show Ironwood implemented on several IoT devices, measure its performance, and show how it performs better than existing key agreement schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group theoretic cryptography is a relatively new discipline and overviews can be found in the two recent monographs [11] , [19] . A number of group theoretic key agreement protocols have been introduced in the last two decades, including [3] and [16] , but attacks on the conjugacy search problem such as those appearing in [8] , [9] , [14] suggest that these types of schemes may not be practical over braid groups in low resource environments. To overcome these deficiencies, in this paper, we introduce the notion of a meta key agreement and authentication protocol (MKAAP) (see §IV) which has many of the properties of a public key method but relies on the clever distribution of certain private keys.
Starting with a quantum-resistant one-way function based in braid group theory we've constructed an MKAAP which we present in this paper. This MKAAP is very robust and is immune from all known attacks introduced in group theoretic cryptography and delivers linear time performance on low footprint processors.
Previous Work
In 2006 [1] introduced a key agreement protocol based in group theory (specifically the braid group) that withstood several attacks over the past decade. First [18] determined that if braids are too short then it's possible to find the conjugating factor and use that to break the system. However it was pointed out in [12] that in practice the braids are long enough that this attack can never succeed in practice. It's akin to using Fermat to factor short RSA keys. Second, [15] showed a linear algebra attack (KTT) that would allow an attacker to determine part of the private key data. However, [10] showed that this is just a class of weak keys and by choosing the private key data in a specific way this attack is defeated.
More recently [6] built upon the defeated KTT attack, and using all of the public information were able to, after a large precomputation, spend several hours to reconstruct the shared secret. This attack not only required access to the public parameters but also both public keys (including their permutations). It was shown in [2] that the attack work grows as the size of the permutation order grows as well as the size of the braid group.
Still, none of these attacks targeted the underlying hard problems in the braid group, or attempted to attack the one-way function introduced in [1] called EMultiplication.
Our Contribution
This paper introduces the Ironwood meta key agreement and authentication protocol whose security is based on hard problems in group theory. Ironwood leverages the one-way function, E-Multiplication, but creates a different construction that removes some of the public information required to mount any of the previous attacks. In addition to being immune from previous attacks, Ironwood is also quantum resistant. Specifically, Shor's quantum algorithm [20] which has been shown to break RSA, ECC, and several other public key crypto systems does not seem applicable for attacking Ironwood. Further, Grover's quantum search algorithm [21] is not as impactful on Ironwood due to the fact that the running time of Ironwood is linear in the key length.
This paper first reviews the braid group and colored Burau represtation. Next it reviews E-Multiplication, and then introduces the meta key agreement and authentication protocol. Following that it introduces Ironwood and presents a security analysis.
II. COLORED BURAU REPRESENTATION OF THE BRAID

GROUP
Let B N denote the braid group on N strands with Artin presentation
Every β ∈ B N determines a permutation σ β ∈ S N , the group of permutations of N letters, as follows. For 1 ≤ i < N , define σ i ∈ S N be the i th simple transposition, which maps i → i + 1, i + 1 → i, and leaves {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , N } fixed. We may take
The colored Burau representation of the braid group was introduced by Morton in [17] in 1998, but we shall make use of a variation of Morton's original representation. Associate to each Artin generator b i , with 1 ≤ i < N , a colored Burau matrix CB(b i ) where
We similarly define CB(b 
. . .
1
. . . 
. We now wish to define a multiplication of colored Burau pairs such that the natural mapping from the braid group to the group of matrices with entries in the ring of Laurent polynomials in the t i is a homomorphism.
Given a Laurent polynomial
N ], a permutation in σ ∈ S N can act (on the left) by permuting the indices of the variables. We denote this action by f → σ f :
We extend this action to N × N matrices over 
The colored Burau representation is then defined by
One checks that Π CB satisfies the braid relations and, hence, defines a representation of B N .
III. E-MULTIPLICATION
E-Multiplication was first introduced in [1] as a oneway function used as a building block to create multiple cryptographic constructions. We recall its definition here.
Let F q denote the finite field of q elements. A set of T-values is defined to be a collection of non-zero field elements:
. Given a set of T-values, we can evaluate any Laurent polynomial f (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t N ) to obtain an element of F q :
We extend this notation to matrices over Laurent polynomials in the obvious way.
With all these components in place we can now define E-Multiplication. By definition, E-Multiplication is an operation that takes as input two ordered pairs,
where β ∈ B N and σ β ∈ S N as before, and where M ∈ GL(N, F q ), and σ 0 ∈ S N . We denote E-Multiplication with a star: ⋆. The result of E-Multiplication, denoted
In the general case, when
where we interpret the right of (3) by associating leftto-right. One can check that this is independent of the expression of β in the Artin generators.
IV. META KEY AGREEMENT AND AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (MKAAP)
We now introduce the notion of a meta key agreement and authentication protocol which is not a true public key crypto system but has many of the features of a public key cryptosystem. Specifically, while it does require secure provisioning of each device by a Trusted Third Party (TTP), once provisioned, devices can authenticate to each other offline without further support. By a device, we mean a machine that can execute a cryptographic protocol and be capable of transmitting and receiving messages.
Definition (MKAAP)
Assume there is a network consisting of a Home Device (HD) and a set of other devices (D i , i=1,2,3,. . . ) that communicate with the HD over an open channel. Assume that there is a TTP which has distributed secret information to the HD and the other devices. An MKAAP is an algorithm with the following properties:
• The MKAAP allows the HD to authenticate (and/ 
V. IRONWOOD MKAAP
We now describe the Ironwood MKAAP. It may be assumed that the following information is publicly known.
Public Information:
• The braid group B N for a fixed even integer N .
• A finite field F q of q elements.
• A non-singular matrix m 0 ∈ GL(N, F q ).
• The operation of E-multiplication based on B N and F q .
Next, we discuss the initial distribution of secret information by the TTP.
TTP Data Generation and Distribution:
The TTP creates two sets of commuting conjugates:
where some portion of the α i are purebraids (i.e., have a trivial permutation), and one set of T-values:
The TTP writes the first set of conjugates C α and the set T into the memory of the Home Device (HD).
Next, the TTP creates braid words β i ∈ B N (for i = 1, 2, . . .) which are random products of conjugates from the second set C γ and creates the colored Burau pairs (β i , σ i ) where σ i is the permutation associated to β i . For each such (β i , σ i ), the TTP chooses a random non-singular matrix
with c k,i ∈ F q , and using T performs the E-multiplication
Here Id is the identity permutation and M i ∈ GL(N, F q ). Finally, the TTP creates a certificate Cert i which contains a digitally signed copy of Pub i and writes Cert i and C i into the memory of D i , the i th device in the network.
Once the TTP distribution is completed authentication and key agreement between the Home Device and the other devices in the network may begin. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Ironwood Authentication and Key Agreement Prototol
Step 1: The device D i sends HD the certificate Cert i which contains a copy of Pub i which has been digitally signed by the TTP. Here Pub i is the public key of D i and the matrix C i is the private key of D i .
Step 2: The HD generates two ephemeral non-singular matrices
Step 3: The HD generates an ephemeral permutation σ and two ephemeral braids β, β ′ which are random words in C α and which have the same permutation σ = σ β = σ β ′ . This can be accomplished efficiently by first generating a braid using the first half of conjugates, and then create the second braid by using the same set of conjugates and adding choices from the set of conjugates where α i are purebraids. Step 4: Using T , the HD computes the following two E-multiplications:
Step 5: The HD has received Pub i = (C i M i , σ i ) in the signed digital signature sent by D i . Next, using T , the HD computes the following two E-multiplications:
Step 6: The HD computes:
th column of the matrix Y,
th column of the matrix Y ′ .
Step 7: The HD sends D i the pair:
Step 8: The device D i computes the matrix and vector multiplications:
which it can do since it knows its private key C i and has received C ′ M ′ M −1 C −1 and s from the HD.
Shared Secret:
The shared secret is the column vector s ′ known to both HD and D i .
Step 9: The final step is to authenticate the device D i . It is enough to verify that the HD and D i have obtained the same shared secret. Methods for doing this, such as using a hash to create a validation value or using a nonce and Message Authentication Code (MAC) in a challenge/response protocol are well known, so we do not reproduce them here.
It is not at all obvious that the column vector s ′ produced by the HD and D i have to be the same. We now provide a proof of this.
First of all, the braids β and β ′ commute with β i , since they are formed from the sets of conjugates C α , C γ , respectively, and these sets of conjugates commute. It follows from step 5 that
Now, define an unknown matrix X by the formula
It follows that
Next, define a column vector x where
The column vector x is just the (N/2) th column of the matrix X. Hence
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF IRONWOOD
The Ironwood protocol is an outgrowth of the Algebraic Eraser TM key agreement protocol (AEKAP) first published in [1] in 2006. The security of the AEKAP was based on the difficulty of inverting E-multiplication and the hard problem of solving the simultaneous conjugacy search problem for subgroups of the braid group. The AEKAP had withstood numerous attacks (see [8] , [9] , [10] , [12] , [14] , [18] ) in the last 10 years. However, the recent successful attack of Ben-Zvi, Blackburn, Tsaban (BBT) [6] , for small parameter sizes, requires an increase in key size (see [2] ) to make AEKAP secure against the BBT attack.
The Ironwood protocol was designed to be totally immune to the BBT attack [6] without compromising on key size, speed or power consumption. A necessary requirement for the security of Ironwood is that the Tvalues which are distributed to the Home Device cannot be obtained by an adversary. The T-values are not on any of the other devices D i in the network. Without knowing the T-values the BBT attack [6] cannot proceed at all.
It is also clear that the Ironwood protocol satisfies the last requirement of an MKAAP that if an attacker can break into one of the devices D i and obtain its private key, then only the security of that particular device is breached, all other devices remain secure. This is because the only secret information on the device D i is the private key C i . Knowledge of C i has no affect on the key agreement and authentication protocol between the HD and other devices C j with j = i.
Invalid Public Key attack
The devices D i in the network are subject to an invalid public key attack of the type presented in [7] under the assumption that an adversary can impersonate the Home Device (HD) and run the Ironwood authentication protocol (using invalid public keys) with a device D i . This type of attack can be easily defeated (see [5] ) provided the D i uses a hash to create a validation value that does not reveal the shared secret in any way or the D i uses a nonce and Message Authentication Code (MAC) in a challenge/response protocol.
In the reverse case, where the devices D i are attempting to authenticate the HD, if an HD reveals s to an attacker using an invalid key attack it may lead to potential leakage. There are two approaches to protect against an invalid public key attack against an HD. In the first case, the device D i would have its public key signed by a trusted CA/TTP. This would ensure to the HD that the public key is valid by checking the certificate. In the second case the HD must check that the public key is not invalid before releasing s. To do this it must ensure that a sufficient number of elements in the public key matrix are not zero. With a sufficient number of non-zero entries the E-Multiplication process will ensure a sufficient mixing in the resulting computations, eliminating the possibility of using linear algebra to obtain information about the private key of the HD.
In both cases the use of single-use ephemeral keys prevent an attack. If an attacker works against an HD (or a D i ) which uses a single-use ephemeral key then multiple invalid-key attacks would always return unique responses.
Length Attacks and Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Attacks
Although AEDSA has withstood length attacks and simultaneous conjugacy search attacks (see [12] ) of the type presented in [8] , [9] , [14] , [18] , these attacks completely fail for Ironwood. This is because it is assumed that the two sets of conjugates, S α , S γ , are not known to an adversary. These two sets of conjugates are not in memory on any of the devices D i , and only one of the sets S α is in memory on the HD. An assumption of Ironwood is that an adversary cannot obtain secret information stored on the HD.
A Class of Weak Keys
It is crucial that C i does not commute with M ′ M −1 . Otherwise an adversary can compute
Similarly, it is also crucial that M i does not commute with
Otherwise an attacker can compute
The probability that one of the above commuting occurs is very small.
Quantum Resistance of Ironwood
The Ironwood MKAAP and underlying EMultiplication are resistant to known quantum attacks. The following sections provide an overview and analysis.
Resistance to Shor's Quantum Algorithm:
Shor's quantum algorithm [20] enables a sufficiently large quantum computer to factor numbers or compute discrete logs in polynomial time, effectively breaking RSA, ECC, and DH. It relies on the existence of a fast quantum algorithm to solve the Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP) when the hidden subgroup is a finite cyclic group. It is known that HSP can be solved on a quantum computer when the hidden subgroup is abelian [22] .
Ironwood, but more specifically E-Multiplication, are constructions based on the infinite non-abelian braid group. In fact, the braid group is torsion free and, hence, has no finite subgroups. As a result, there seems to be no way to apply Shor's algorithm to attack Ironwood.
Resistance to Grover's Quantum Search Algorithm:
Grover's quantum search algorithm [21] allows a Quantum computer to search for a particular element in an unordered n-element set in a constant times √ n steps as opposed to a constant times n steps required on a classical computer. Resistance to Grover's search algorithm requires increasing the search space. Since E-Multiplication scales linearly, this means that if an attacker has access to a quantum computer running Grover's algorithm, it is only necessary to double the running time of Ironwood to maintain the same security level that currently exists for attacks by classical computers. In comparison, the running time of ECC would have to increase by a factor of 4 since ECC is a based on a quadratic algorithm. We assume that Ironwood is running on the braid group B N over the finite field F q . Note that there q N polynomials of degree N − 1 over F q . So a brute force search for a particular polynomial of degree N − 1 over F q has security level q N .
Brute Force Attacks on the Ironwood Key Agreement Protocol
• The brute force security level of the matrix C i is q N .
• The brute force security levels of the matrices C, C ′ are q N .
The T-values is a set of field elements {τ 1 , τ 2 , . . . , τ N } where none of the τ i = 0 or 1.
• The brute force security level of the T-values is (q − 2)
N .
Note that the size of the public keys Pub i of the devices D i is N 2 · log 2 (q) + N log 2 (N ) and the size of the public key of the HD is (N 2 + N ) · log 2 (q). We can thus assert • The brute force security level of the exchanged key is 2 N log 2 (q) = q N .
The ephemeral private braids β, β ′ of the HD are conjugates in the B N . The number of all braid words of length L which are conjugates is ≥ (L/2) N −1 .
• The brute force security level of the private braids
It follows that the brute force security level of the Ironwood key agreement protocol is at least
If we choose L ≥ 2(q − 2)
1− 1 N then the brute force security level of of the Ironwood key exchange protocol is at least (q − 2) N .
VII. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
For testing purposes Ironwood was implemented on multiple platforms. Because the Other Devices only need to perform a single matrix multiplication and a single vector multiplication, we focused our effort on the requirements of the Home Device, as those operations are more consuming and therefore more interesting to explore.
Operationally the Home Device needs to perform two sets of E-Multiplication operations (one with β and another with β ′ ), which take the majority of the execution time. A single E-Multiplication operation in B N requires N multiplies and N additions over the finite field F q . These operations, in turn, gets multiplied by the number of Artin generators in each braid.
We generated key material using B 16 F 256 for a proposed 2 128 security level. We generated 32 conjugates for each set and from there generated key material for testing. For this testing we generated 10 sets of Home Device keys which averaged a braid length of 2659. 2 The second platform was an NXP LPC1768 running at 48MHz, which contains an embedded ARM Cortex M3. We compiled our code using GCC (arm-none-eabigcc) version 4.9.3 using optimization level -O3. This built down into 2578 bytes of ROM and the runtime required 1192 bytes of RAM. Running the Ironwood shared secret calculation over the ten keys, this ARM platform required anywhere from 1,538,472 to 2,026,216 cycles to compute a shared secret, resulting in a runtime of 32.1 to 42.2ms (averaging 37.4ms). The third platform was a TI CC2650, an embedded ARM Cortex M3 running at 48MHz on TI-RTOS. On this platform we used TI's arm compiler (listed as TI v5.2.0). It was configured at optimization level 4 (Whole Program optimizations) with a size-speed tradeoff (SST) of 5 (ranging from 0 to 5, 0 being fully size optimized, 5 being fully speed optimized). At this level the code used 3568 bytes of ROM and 1192 bytes of RAM. With this setting Ironwood computed a shared secret in an average of 37.4ms.
We also performed tests using the size-speed tradeoff of 2, which resulted in a smaller code size of only 1954 bytes of ROM and resulted in a very minor speed penalty, reducing the average computation time to 37.6ms. Note that on this platform we couldn't get a cycle count, only a timer, and the timer API only has a 2 16 cycle resolution timer, which means the timer increments every 2 16 /48 6 = 1.37ms. This implies the timer results are +/-0.7ms. However the times are still on par with the timing on the LPC1768. Implementations of Ironwood have been built and tested on multiple platforms, and we have shown the performance numbers achieved on three different platforms leveraging two different architectures. Specifically, we show that we can achieve a key agreement on an MSP430 in 212ms and 37ms on an ARM Cortex M3.
